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Abstract
Black-box machine learning models are used in critical decision-making domains, giving rise
to several calls for more algorithmic transparency . The drawback is that model explanations
can leak information about the training data and the explanation data used to generate
them, thus undermining data privacy . To address this issue, we propose differentially private
algorithms to construct feature-based model explanations. We design an adaptive differentially
private gradient descent algorithm, that finds the minimal privacy budget required to produce
accurate explanations. It reduces the overall privacy loss on explanation data, by adaptively
reusing past differentially private explanations. It also amplifies the privacy guarantees with
respect to the training data. We evaluate the implications of differentially private models and
our privacy mechanisms on the quality of model explanations.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models are currently applied in a variety of high-stakes domains, e.g. providing
predictive healthcare analytics, assessing insurance policies, and making credit decisions. These
domains require high prediction accuracy over high-dimensional data; as a result, they adopt
increasingly complex architectures, making them harder to interpret. What makes the problem
even more challenging is that these models are usually used as black-box algorithms: they only
output a decision, without providing detailed information on its intermediate computations.
Growing mistrust of black-box algorithms in high-stakes domains resulted in a widespread call
for algorithmic transparency [17, 20]. This term broadly refers to methods that offer additional
information about the underlying algorithmic decision-making process. In this work, we focus on
model-agnostic feature based explanations as in [6, 11, 13, 21, 27, 33]. Model-agnostic methods
often use a dataset labeled by the black-box model to generate model explanations, referred to as
the explanation dataset . This dataset is often just a subset of the training data, or sampled from
the same distribution.
The problem is that offering additional information can result in significant data privacy risks ,
by leaking sensitive information about the underlying explanation and training data, which can
be exploited by inference attacks [29]. Some feature-based model explanations directly depend on
model parameters [3, 5, 31, 32, 35], which even further increases their privacy vulnerabilities with
respect to white-box inference attacks [25]. As a related issue, model explanations can also magnify
the risks of model reconstruction attacks [24], which are however not the focus of this paper.
Thus far, there has been little work on modeling the relation between algorithmic transparency
and privacy [13, 18, 29], and on designing model explanations that protect data privacy . The
destructive impact of randomized privacy mechanisms on the fidelity of model explanations is
also not studied.
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1.1 Our Contributions
We propose provably sound, model-agnostic, and differentially private algorithms for computing
model explanations that protect the sensitive information in the explanation and training datasets .
Our explanations are sound in the sense that they are provably similar to some standard model
explanations, such as LIME [27]. Our methodology can be adapted to any explanation method
that relies on generating accurate local models around the data point one tries to explain.
We first design a baseline interactive mechanism that outputs feature-based model explanations,
while guaranteeing differential privacy for each query. Building upon this baseline, we design
our main algorithm: an adaptive differential privacy mechanism for model explanations. The
main challenge, which we resolve in this approach, is to optimize the composed privacy loss of
the model explanation over all queries, while maintaining low explanation error. The adaptive
algorithm utilizes previously released DP explanations effectively, significantly reducing privacy
spending on new model explanation queries. We achieve this by selecting a better initialization
point for the our underlying gradient descent algorithm using past queries. We also improve
upon bounds in [28] on the convergence of the DP gradient descent method (under a minor
assumption), offering faster initialization-dependent convergence rates. We further show that
when we approach the optimal point, the DP gradient descent algorithm oscillates around the
optimal point, spending a significant chunk of the privacy budget while obtaining only a negligible
expected utility. This insight leads to an enhanced adaptive algorithm which offers far better
privacy savings at only a minor loss in accuracy. Finally, we propose a non-interactive differential
privacy algorithm which generates explanations without spending any further privacy budget.
Our algorithms bound the (differential) privacy loss with respect to explanation data. Privacy
protection of the training data is normally done during model training, or via differentially private
prediction algorithms. However, we show that our mechanism, which uses the underlying model
as a black-box, can also moderately amplify the privacy protection of the training data. As
mentioned previously, protecting the privacy of sensitive data must be done in tandem with
preserving explanation quality : this is crucial as the randomness in differential privacy mechanisms
might reduce explanation fidelity. Ensuring that our mechanisms preserve explanation quality
requires careful analysis of the underlying gradient descent mechanism: we determine the number
of iterations required to minimize the privacy budget spending required for an explanation query,
hence maximizing the overall explanation quality. When protecting data using differentially private
models, the randomness in the decision boundaries of differentially private models decreases
the convergence speed of our approximation algorithms, which results in spending more privacy
budget. This is demonstrated in our empirical results: stronger privacy requirements for the
underlying model degrade explanation quality.
1.2 Related Work
Model explanations are vulnerable to membership inference attacks that can infer if a data point
is part of the model’s training set [29]. A recent work [18] studies the construction of differentially
private and interpretable predictions — rather than explanations — for neural networks. But, it
does not offer any bounds on the utility loss due to privacy. An earlier work presents QII [13]
that designs an interactive differentially private mechanism to protect the explanation dataset.
However, repeated queries result in an unacceptable cumulative information leakage and a loose
privacy guarantee. It also does not provide any privacy analysis for the training dataset.
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Table 1: Table of Notations
Notation Description
X explanation dataset
T training dataset
m size of the dataset X
n dimension of the dataset X
f(·) black-box model
(ˆ, δˆ) privacy parameters differentially private model
(, δ) privacy parameters for explanation for explanation dataset
φPriv (·) private explanation
Cp,k convex set of possible explanations {φ : ‖φ‖p ≤ k}
α : R+ → R+ weight function
L(·) loss function
φ∗(·) optimal solution of the loss function L(·)
F(c, ~z) class of weight functions with bounded sensitivity of c
E(φPriv ) utility loss of the private explanation φPriv
(min, δmin) minimum privacy requirement for each query
ite privacy spending at each gradient descent iteration
σmin variance required by the Gaussian mechanism
H history consist of explained queries in past
X ′ proxy explanation dataset for non-interactive phase
γ amplification of the training privacy
2 Problem Statement
Consider a black-box decision-making machine learning model f : Rn → R trained on the training
dataset T . The model returns the predicted label, and provides no more information about its
decision. Our goal is to generate a model explanation φ(~z,X , f(X )), whose input is a point of
interest ~z, an explanation dataset X = {~x1, . . . , ~xm} ⊂ Rn (used to generate the explanation),
and the output of f on X . Model explanation algorithms can also use additional information: this
can be a prior over the data [6], access to model queries [1, 13, 27], knowledge about the model
hypothesis class [2, 31, 35], or access to the source code [12]. Table 1 summarizes our notations.
We focus on feature-based model explanations: φ(~z) is a vector in Rn, where φi(~z) measures the
effect that the i-th feature has on the predicted label f(~z).
Existing explanation algorithms assume some degree of access to data labeled by f . Access to
the relevant data for generating explanations is crucial: when having only black-box access to the
model, information about its behavior over data is essentially the only available source one can use
to generate explanations. In addition, it is crucial that X is sampled from the same distribution
as the data used to train f ; otherwise, one runs the risk of generating explanations that are
inappropriate for the model’s actual behavior on the data that it was given (see discussion in
[13]). Indeed, using the training set to generate explanations is standard practice [17].
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2.1 Model Explanations
Feature based explanations are often local model approximations in a region around the point
of interest ~z [27, 33, 32, 34]. Our objective is to find a linear function φ, centered at a point of
interest ~z, that minimizes the local empirical model error over the explanation dataset X . We
define the empirical local loss L(φ, ~z,X , f) of a linear function φ, over X labeled by f , as
L(φ, ~z,X , f) , 1|X |
∑
~x∈X
α(‖~x− ~z‖)(φ> · (~x− ~z)− f(~x))2, (1)
where, α : R+ → R+ is a weight function. We find a local explanation within some region C that
minimizes L(φ, ~z,X , f). We assume C to be a bounded convex set; more concretely, we set C to
Cp,k = {φ : ‖φ‖p ≤ k}. An optimal model explanation is thus one that minimizes loss around the
point of interest.
φ∗(~z) = arg min
~φ∈C
L(φ, ~z,X , f) (2)
The weight function α is a decreasing function in ‖~z− ~x‖. In other words, φ is a local explanation,
rewarded for correctly classifying points closer to ~z. For example, in the LIME framework, α
takes a value of 0 for any points ~x ∈ X that are more than a certain distance away from the
point of interest ~z. Our framework generalizes LIME and other local optimization-based model
explanations.
2.2 Evaluation Metrics
We assume an adversary queries the model f with a sequence of data points, requesting expla-
nations for the model’s decisions over them. Given the obtained explanations, the adversary
can reconstruct sensitive information about the explanation data X , and the training data T .
Our objective is to design a differentially private algorithm that can provably protect private
data against inference attacks, and provides accurate explanations. We evaluate our explanation
models based on two key performance metrics: their differential privacy loss , and their utility loss
in comparison to the optimal explanation, as described in Eq. (2).
Following the definition of differential privacy (DP) [15], a model explanation φ(·) is (, δ)-
differentially private if for any sequence of queries (points of interest) ~z1, ~z2, · · · , ~zk, for any two
neighboring explanation datasets X and X ′ — i.e. datasets that differ by the omission of a single
point — and any explanations Si ⊆ Rn, we have
Pr[φ1 ∈ S1, φ2 ∈ S2, · · · , φk ∈ Sk] ≤ e · Pr[φ′1 ∈ S1, φ′2 ∈ S2, · · · , φ′k ∈ Sk] + δ, (3)
where, φi = φ(~zi,X , f(X )), and φ′i = φ(~zi,X ′, f(X ′)). We similarly define guarantees for two
neighboring training datasets T and T ′. This guarantees ensures that the adversary cannot
accumulate enough information from their queries to reconstruct data records in the explanation
set or taining set, up to the protection level determined by privacy loss parameters for both
datasets  and δ respectively.
Our main focus is to protect the sensitive information about the explanation dataset X , in
Section 5, we show that our private explanations are differentially private w.r.t. training dataset
as well.
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Algorithm 1: Interactive DP Model Explanation
Input: POI ~z ∈ Rn, explanation dataset X , DP parameters  > 0, δ > 0, weight function
α(‖~x− ~z‖) ∈ F(1, ~z), learning rate function η(t) ∈ R+, and the number of GD iterations T .
Output: φPriv
1: Set the parameter for the Gaussian mechanism σ ← 1m
√
16T log
(
e +
√
T
δ
)
log Tδ ;
2: Initialize φ with an arbitrary vector in C2,1;
3: return DPGD-Explain(φ, σ, T);
4: Procedure DPGD-Explain(φ, σ, T)
5: φ{1} ← φ
6: for t = 1, . . . , T − 1 do
7: ξt ←
(
φ{t} − η(t)[∇L(φ,X ) +N (0, σ2I)])
8: φ{t+1} ← arg minφ∈C2,1 ‖φ− ξt‖
9: end
10: return φ{T}
The quality of a model explanation is measured in terms the difference between its (expected)
loss and the loss of the optimal explanation which is referred as approximation loss of explanation:
E(φ) = E [L(φ, ~z,X , f)]− L(φ∗(~z), ~z,X , f), (4)
In the following sections, we describe a variety of mechanisms computing differentially private
model explanations. We start with a simple non-adaptive mechanism in Section 3, using it as
a foundation for more complex adaptive mechanisms (Section 4). Finally, we show that our
mechanisms offer privacy guarantees with respect to the training data as well (Section 5).
3 A Basic DP Mechanism for Model Explanation
We begin our exploration of differentially private model explanations with a simple approach:
approximating each local model explanation in a differentially private manner. Algorithm 1
presents a gradient descent algorithm to solve (2) while satisfying differential privacy as in (3).
We compute a differentially private model explanation φPriv by optimizing (2) in the convex
set C2,1. The gradient descent algorithm (the DPGD-Explain() procedure) uses the Gaussian
mechanism in each iteration to guarantee differential privacy with respect to the explanation
dataset. This is an interactive DP mechanism: for each query, we refer to the (explanation) dataset
for computing the explanations.
The input to our proposed algorithm is the point of interest ~z, and the explanation dataset X
labeled by the function f . It finds the solution in a feasible convex set C (where we use C2,1), for
a local loss function L(·). Its output is a differentially private model explanation φPriv (~z,X , C,L),
as we prove later in this section.
3.1 Sensitivity of the Loss Function
In order to design the differential privacy mechanism, with bounded privacy loss, we first need to
bound the global sensitivity of the gradient of the loss function ∇L(·). The global sensitivity of
∇L(·) could be unbounded for many choices of α(‖~x−~z‖); for example, when α(‖~x−~z‖) = 1‖~x−~z‖2 ,
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this weight function is non-increasing which is a required property for local model approximation.
However, the sensitivity of ∇L(·) for this α(·) is unbounded. Thus, we need to choose from a
family of weight functions that result in a bounded sensitivity for ∇L(·), required by our DP
mechanisms.
In Lemma 3.1 (whose proof is in the appendix), we characterize set of weight functions
α(‖~x− ~z‖2) such that the sensitivity of ∇L(·) is bounded.
Lemma 3.1 (Conditions for Bounded Sensitivity for ∇L(·)). For all explanation dataset X of
size m, and all its neighboring datasets X ′, points of interest ~z, and φ ∈ C, the sensitivity of the
gradient of loss is bounded, ‖∇L(φ,X )−∇L(φ,X ′)‖2 ≤ ( cm
)
, iff α(‖~x− ~z‖) ≤ c2‖~x−~z‖2(‖~x−~z‖2+1)
for every ~x, ~z ∈ Rn.
Proof. See Appendix A
Lemma 3.1 characterizes all weight functions α(·) for which the sensitivity of the gradient
∇L(φ,X ) is bounded. We define the family of desirable weight functions as:
F(c, ~z) =
{
α(·) : α(·) is non-increasing and∀~x ∈ Rn, α(‖~x− ~z‖) ≤ c2‖~x−~z‖(‖~x−~z‖+1)
}
.
Note that F(c, ~z) is non-empty as c2‖~x−~z‖(1+‖~x−~z‖) belongs to the family.The choice of weight
function governs how “local” the model approximation is around a point of interest. For example,
α(‖~x− ~z‖) = e−‖~x−~z‖2 is in F(1, ~z) which exponentially decreases the weight of the data points
according to their distance to the point of interest ~z. This weight function is extremely local.
Thus, it is useful when the explanation dataset X is highly dense in different regions.
3.2 Privacy and Utility Guarantees
We bound the privacy and utility loss of model explanations produced by Algorithm 1. The data
dependent quantity, in each iteration of Algorithm 1, is ∇L(φ,X ). Given Lemma 3.1, we use the
Gaussian mechanism to ensure that the update in each round is differentially private. Using the
differential privacy composition theorem [19, Theorem-4.3], the output of algorithm 1 is (, δ)−
differentially private. We show that the differentially private mechanism for model explanation
offers good utility loss guarantees.
Theorem 3.2 (Bounded Utility Loss). Algorithm 1 is (, δ) differentially private. Moreover,
for given privacy parameters (, δ), if DPGD-Explain() runs for T ≤ min
(
m22
32n log2(e+1/δ)
, 1δ
)
iterations and outputs an explanation φPriv , then E(φPriv ) ∈ O
(
log T√
T
)
. For T = m
22
32n log2(e+1/δ)
,
E(φPriv ) ∈ O
(√
n logm
m
)
.
The bound in Theorem 3.2 is reasonable when the number of features is smaller than
the size of the explanation dataset. Let φPriv be the output of the mechanism described in
Theorem 3.2; while φPriv is differentially private in itself, its privacy loss accumulates as we make
additional model explanation queries. Following the DP composition theorem [19], k independent
(, δ)-private queries result in an (˜, kδ + δ˜)-differentially private output for any δ˜ ∈ (0, 1) and
˜ ∈ O
(
× (ke +
√
k log
(
e + 
√
k/δ˜
))
.
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4 Adaptive Differential Privacy Mechanisms
The explanation algorithm described in Section 3 naively computes an explanation for a queried
data point: it does not utilize any previously released differentially private information. When
Algorithm 1 computes a model explanation, it releases information about the underlying black-
box algorithm in a differentially private manner. This information can be used to generate an
explanation for new queries more economically, resulting in less privacy spending. How can we
utilize past information efficiently?
Let us define this problem more formally. Let ~z1, . . . , ~zh be the sequence of queries pre-
viously explained in a differentially private manner, and their corresponding explanations:
φPriv (~z1), . . . , φ
Priv (~zh). When we receive a new query ~zh+1, our objective is to extract information
from (~z1, φPriv (~z1)), . . . , (~zh, φPriv (~zh)) such that the new query ~zh+1 requires less privacy budget,
without compromising its explanation quality.
If the underlying black-box model behaves in a consistent manner within a local region, then
model explanations in that local region should be consistent: this enables us to exploit previous
queries from the same local region to explain the current query while spending less of the privacy
budget. Moreover, if we can ensure that the DPGD-Explain() procedure converges faster by using
past information, then also we can reduce the resultant privacy spending for the current query.
The above insights are used in our Adaptive Private Interactive Explanation Protocol (Algo-
rithm 3): when computing a model explanation for a new query, it is safe to use previously released
information, as it was computed in a differentially private manner. We use past information in two
ways. Firstly, similar datapoints should have similar explanations: if ~z and ~v are very close to each
other in the dataspace then the model explanations for ~v and ~z (φPriv (~v) and φPriv (~z)) should be
similar. This observation allows us to save time — and privacy budget — when computing new
differentially private model explanations.
Secondly, instead of starting the gradient descent process in Algorithm 1 from an arbitrary
point, we utilize past information to find an approximately optimal starting, resulting in faster
convergence and reduced privacy spending. Ideally, we want to initialize the gradient descent
process at a point as close to an optimal point as possible; however, this selection process should
itself be privacy-preserving. Thus, the budget spent on finding the initialization point should not
exceed the savings obtained by faster convergence.
Our explanation algorithm optimizes Equation 2, a convex function that has a unique
minimum. This fact offers several indicators for a “good” starting point. Ideally, given the history
(~z1, φ
Priv (~z1)), . . . (~zh, φ
Priv (~zh)), we want to select φPriv (~zj) minimizing ‖φPriv (~zj)− φ∗(~zh+1)‖.
However, a tight bound on the sensitivity of minj ‖φPriv (~zj)− φ∗(~zh+1)‖ is difficult to obtain, as
φ∗(zh+1) admits no closed-form solution; thus, searching for an initialization point results in a
noisier selection process, requiring more undesirable privacy spending.
As an alternative, our adaptive differentially private algorithm uses a greedy approach: it
searches for arg minj ‖∇L(~zh+1, φPriv (~zj))‖ which is a good indicator of one’s proximity to the
optimum of the convex function L(·). Moreover, the sensitivity of ‖∇L(~z, φ)‖ is bounded by O( 1m)
(as per Lemma 3.1), which allows us to efficiently search for the optimal point while incurring
minor privacy spending.
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4.1 Finding Similar Points from Prior Explanation Queries
Consider the following weight function, defined for c > 0.
α(‖~x− ~z‖) =
{
1, if ‖~x− ~z‖ ≤
√
2c+1−1
2
c
2‖~x−~z‖(1+‖~x−~z‖) , else
(5)
This weight function α assigns equal weight to all points ~x ∈ X that are close to the point
of interest ~z, and decreases the weight for points further from ~z quadratically in their distance.
This weight function (5) is bounded by 1, and belongs to F(c, ~z). Moreover, this weight function
is “stable”: it preserves the consistency of the local explanation in a small region. We formalize
this property in Lemma 4.1, and use the stable weight function in Equation (5) when running
Algorithm 3.
In Lemma 4.1 we show that the stable weight function α(·) evaluates two close queries ~v
and ~z from the same region similarly. It shows that, if for two explanation queries ~v, ~z satisfy
‖~v − ~z‖ < d, then the ratio of their weight functions is 1 + O(d). This further shows that as
d decreases, the stable weight function assigns similar weights to neighboring datapoints. This
property is highly desirable when the underlying black-box model is consistent in local regions:
it implies that the behavior of our explanation algorithm is also consistent in local regions. For
the sake of exposition, we again write r =
√
2c+1−1
2 , and assume that c (and in particular r) is a
constant.
Lemma 4.1 (Stability of the α(·) Function). If ‖~v − ~z‖ ≤ d then for all ~x ∈ X :
α(‖~x− ~v‖)
α(‖~x− ~z‖) ≤ 1 + max
(
(d2 + 2rd)
r2
, 2(d2 + 2rd+ d)
)
.
Furthermore, if d ∈ o(r) then α(‖~x−~v‖)α(‖~x−~z‖) < 1 +O(d).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Lemma 4.1 bounds the difference in α when ‖~v − ~z‖ ≤ d  r for all ~x ∈ X . Theorem 4.2
shows that for the stable weight function, the queries ~v, ~z will have similar explanations if
‖~v − ~z‖ ≤ d ≤ r. If φ∗(~z) is the optimal solution of Equation 2 for ~z, then Equation (10) shows
that L(φ∗(~z), ~v,X ) ≈ L(φ∗(~z), ~z,X ) when d is small.
Theorem 4.2. (Consistent Explanations in Small Regions) For α(·) described in (5), if we have
φ∗(~z) ∈ arg minφ∈C L(φ, ~z,X ), and φ∗(~v) = arg minφ∈C L(φ,~v,X ) and ‖~x− ~z‖ ≤ d r, then
L(φ∗(~z), ~v,X )− L(φ∗(~v), ~v,X ) < 8d+O(d2).
Moreover, |L(φ,~v,X )− L(φ, ~z,X )| ∈ O(d2) for all φ ∈ C
Proof. See Appendix D
We use Theorem 4.2 to save our privacy budget when we receive two explanation queries
from the same neighborhood. Suppose that the current queried point ~v satisfies ‖~v − ~z‖ ≤ d < r,
and ~z is already explained in a differentially private manner. We can utilize the explanation
for ~z in order to compute an explanation for ~v without spending any privacy budget with little
approximation loss. However, this result only allows us to save the privacy budget if the query ~v
is in the region of some previously explained query ~z.
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4.2 Reusing Prior Explanations for a Better Optimization
Suppose that ~v is not within a small region of ~z, but the model exhibits similar behavior around ~z
and ~v, i.e. ‖∇L(~φPriv (~z), ~v,X )‖2 is sufficiently small; in this case, we can use the explanation of ~z
as an initialization point ~φ{0} for the gradient descent procedure used to generate an explanation
for ~v.
Theorem 4.4 shows that if ‖∇L(~φPriv (~z), ~v)‖2 is sufficiently small, then the gradient descent
method initialized with φ{0} = φPriv (~z) converges significantly faster when computing an explana-
tion for ~v. We also bound the number of iterations required in order to achieve same approximation
error for our explanation compared to a random starting point, as a function of ‖∇L(φ{0}, ~v,X )‖.
Before we prove the Theorem 4.4, we present a technical Lemma 4.3 in which we obtain the
initialization dependent upper bound on the approximation error. Lemma 4.3 shows that the
differentially private gradient descent algorithm converges faster when given a better initialization
point, under minor assumptions. In particular, we show that for T ≤ e1/nσ2 , E(φ{T}, ~v) = q log T√
T
where q ≤ 1, and it decreases linearly in ‖L(φ{0})‖. Equation (11) provides the learning rate for
the differentially private gradient descent algorithm. We note that in general the q
′ log T√
T
bound
holds for differentially private gradient descent when
√
nσ ≤ 1 (see Theorem 3.2) where q′ > 1
therefore T ≤ e1/nσ2 is not an unreasonable assumption.
Recall that DPGD-Explain() in Algorithm 1 uses the following update rule:
ξt =
(
φ{t} − η(t)[∇L(φ,X ) +N (0, σ2I)]) , φ{t+1} = arg min
φ∈C2,1
‖φ− ξt‖ (6)
Lemma 4.3 (Initialization Dependent Upper-Bound). If ‖∇L(φ{0}, ~v,X )‖ = β, then for some c,
and η(t) = c√
t
;
E(φ{T}, ~x) ∈ O
((
(σ2n+ β2)
1
2 + (nσ2 log T )
1
4
) log T√
T
)
(7)
Proof. See Appendix E
Theorem 4.4 (Number of Iterations). Let φ{0} = φPriv (~z) be the initialization point given to the
DPGD-Explain() procedure, with ‖∇L(φ{0}, ~v,X )‖ = β. Given the update rule in Equation (6),
if max(
√
nσ, β) ≤ 1(log T )a for a > 12 , then for T ′ = max(
√
nσ, β)1−
1
2aT : E(φ{T}, ~v) ∈ O
(
log T√
T
)
.
Proof. See Appendix F
Our Adaptive approach uses Theorem 4.4 to reduce privacy spending, by accelerating the
optimization process. If Algorithm 3 has already explained some query ~z with a sufficiently
small ‖∇L(φPriv (~z), ~v‖ = β then by initializing the optimization to φ{0} = φPriv (~z), we require
to spend some (β dependent) exponent of β factor of the total privacy required for the given
approximation loss. Moreover, this exponent is a non-decreasing function of β, which ensures that
better initialization points require fewer iterations to achieve a better approximation.
4.3 An Adaptive Explanation Protocol
The key idea of our algorithm is that once it releases enough information about the underlying
explanation dataset, it utilizes this information to explain new queries with less privacy spending
using Theorems 4.2 and 4.4.
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Algorithm 2: Adaptive DP for Parameter Selection
Input: ~zh ∈ Rn, explanation dataset X , History H, privacy spending for parameter selection para,
and the number of GD steps T , minimum variance σmin;
Output: Input variables for DPGD-Explain() for the query ~zh;
1: Procedure Parameters-DPGD(~zh, H, para, σmin,X , T)
2: if H == ∅ then
3: Arbitrary φ ∈ C2,1;
4: return φ, σmin, T ;
5: else
6: φbest ← φPriv (~zj) with Pr ∝ exp
(
−m · para · ‖∇L(φ
Priv (~zj),~zh)‖
2
)
for ~zj ∈ H
7: β ← ‖∇L(φbest , ~zh)‖;
8: σ ← max
(
β√
n
, σmin
)
;
9: a← log
1√
nσ
log log T ; // Thm. 4.4
10: if a > 12 then
11: T ′ ← (√nσ)1− 12aT ;
12: else
13: T ′ ← T ;
14: end
15: end
16: return φbest, σ, T ′;
Our mechanism (Algorithm 3) takes a total privacy budget (, δ), a minimum privacy required
for each query (min, δmin) (the maximum information leakage allowed per query), an explanation
dataset X , a maximal number of iterations T (which also defines the explanation quality require-
ment), and adaptively generates differentially private model explanations for a string of queries
~z1, . . . until it exhausts its entire privacy budget (, δ).
Given the minimum privacy loss parameters min, δmin, we have a lower bound on the variance
of Gaussian noise σmin (Gaussian Mechanism [14]), added at each iteration, where ite is computed
using the composition theorem. This is the minimum variance required to achieve the resultant δ
parameter with at least δmin spent per query.
At each query ~zh, Algorithm 3 first inspects whether it has already explained some other
data point ~zj using differentially private gradient decent algorithm such that ‖~zh − ~zj‖ < d
in line 6. If such ~zj exists, it outputs φPriv (~zj) for ~zh without any privacy spending, which is
sufficiently accurate (Theorem 4.2). We note that if the explanation of ~zj was not computed from
scratch (used explanation for some other ~zj′ ; j′ < j) then we can not use the explanation of ~zj for
~zh because ‖~zj′ − ~zh‖ might be > d. This is taken care by Flag() (see second condition of “if"
statement in line 2 of Algorithm 3).
If there is no such ~zj , then our adaptive algorithm selects parameters for DPGD-Explain()
adaptively exploiting past explained queries such that it converges faster with less privacy
spending and lower approximation loss using Theorem 4.4. The adaptive parameter selection
using history is explained in Algorithm 2. Given current explanation query, it picks φPriv (~zj) with
minimum ‖∇L(φPriv (~zj), ~zh)‖ as an initialization point for the gradient descent algorithm using
a differentially private exponential mechanism [14]. It then computes the number of iterations
required depending on the selected initialization point according to Theorem 4.4.
Algorithm 2 spends ite differential privacy budget to choose the starting point. However,
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Algorithm 3: Adaptive DP for Model Explanation
Input: Queries {~z1, . . . } ∈ Rn arriving one by one, explanation dataset X , privacy budget (, δ),
the minimum per-query privacy loss (min, δmin), and the number of GD steps T ;
1: H ← ∅, spent, δspent ← 0;
2: ite ← min√
8T log 2δmin
; // Privacy budget to spend per iteration
3: σmin =
√
2 log(2.5T/δmin)
m·ite ; // Variance needed for Gaussian mechanism
4: d← log T√
T
; // Distance bound required according to Thm. 4.2
5: for h = 1, . . . ,∞ do
6: if ∃~zj ∈ H with ‖~zh − ~zj‖ ≤ d & Flag(~zj)= > then
7: φPriv (~zh)← φPriv (~zj); // Use a nearby point (Thm. 4.2)
8: report: φPriv (~zh); // Report explanation of ~zh
9: H.append(~zh : φPriv (~zh),Flag(~zh)= ⊥)
10: else
11: φbest , σ, T ′ ← Parameters-DPGD(~zh, H, ite, σmin,X , T);
12: φPriv (~zh)← DPGD-Explain(φbest , σ, T ′);
13: Update spent, δspent; // via the Strong Composition Theorem
14: if spent >  or δspent ≥ δ then
15: break; // Privacy budget is exhausted
16: end
17: report: φPriv (~zh);
18: H.append(~zh : φPriv (~zh),Flag(~zh)= >);
19: end
20: end
even if ‖∇L(φPriv (~zj), ~zh)‖ ≤ 1/ log T we need to run only
√
β fraction of total iterations of the
differentially private gradient descent algorithm and saves at least a β
1
4 factor of the privacy
budget spent with lower approximation loss (Theorem 4.4).
Algorithm 3 is (, δ)− differentially private: all computation steps are conducted in a differen-
tially private manner, and the total privacy budget spend does not exceed  and δ.
Theorem 4.5 shows that Algorithm 3 achieves a nearly optimal approximation when n m.
Algorithm 3 is more efficient when the size of the explanation dataset m is much larger than
the number of features n; this decreases
√
nσmin, allowing us to exploit smaller values of β. This
trade-off between privacy saving and dimensionality is intuitive: in order to achieve a desirable
level of privacy, differentially private gradient descent adds noise proportional to
√
n
m at each
iteration.
We can observe that the gain in approximation loss becomes negligible as t increases in
comparison to the required extra privacy budget for that gain. More formally, the privacy budget
for t iterations is O(√tite) by the Composition Theorem. This implies that the required privacy
budget from iteration t to t+ 1 is O(ite/
√
t); on the other hand, the gain in approximation loss
from iteration t to t + 1 is O(1/t 32 ). Therefore we can stop after a small number of iterations.
For example, for a dataset of size 108, the optimal algorithm (in terms of approximation loss)
suggests running 104 iterations, offering an approximation loss bounded by 0.19, whereas for 1000
iterations, the approximation loss is bounded by 0.22. The difference in privacy spending between
the two instances is roughly 68ite. Therefore, for practical purposes, one can use fewer iterations
to save more privacy budget with only a negligent deprecation in approximation loss.
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Theorem 4.5. (Utility Loss) Let φPriv (z1), . . . φPriv (zh) be the output of the Algorithm 3, then for
all j = 1, . . . , h; E(φPriv (zj), ~zj) ∈ O
(
log T√
T
)
. Moreover, for lower dimensional setting (m > nite )
and T =
√
m: E(φPriv (zj), ~zj) ∈ O
(
logm/m
1
4
)
Proof. See Appendix G
4.4 Early Termination and an Enhanced Adaptive Algorithm
Algorithm 3 is more efficient when the size of the explanation dataset m is much larger than
the number of features n; this decreases
√
nσmin, allowing us to exploit smaller values of β. This
trade-off between privacy saving and dimensionality is intuitive: in order to achieve a desirable
level of privacy, differentially private gradient descent adds noise proportional to
√
n
m at each
iteration. Therefore, in high-dimensional settings, the noise required for privacy dominates the
lower norm of the initial gradient and prevents Algorithm 3 from saving more of the privacy
budget.
During the gradient descent optimization phase, if ‖∇L(φ{t})‖ ≤ √nσmin, then Gaussian noise
starts dominating ∇L(φ{t}). This domination by random Gaussian noise prevents further improve-
ment in the loss function. Thus, the extra privacy budget spent once ‖∇L(φ{t})‖ ≤ √nσmin does
not significantly improve explanation quality (approximation error); rather, it starts oscillating
around the optimal point, resulting in slower convergence/decrease in approximation loss. There-
fore, it is not beneficial to spend additional privacy budget once ‖L(φ{t})‖ < √nσ; this observation
is confirmed in Figure 4. This motivates us to define an unrestricted version of Algorithm 3,
which maximizes possible savings by the initial point by iterating for max{β1− 12aT, 2} times for
all queries, where a is the solution to β = 1loga T . The main intuition behind this approach is that
whenever adaptive algorithm finds an initialization with β = ‖L(φ{0})‖  √nσmin then increasing
the number of iterations does not result in faster convergence as Gaussian noise dominates: privacy
spending in these cases offers little improvement in loss.
To implement the enhanced adaptive algorithm, we only change Line 8 to T ′ ← β1−1/2aT
(instead of
√
nσ1−1/2aT ) in Algorithm 2 where a = log 1/βlog log T . We do not maintain a similar general
theoretical bound on the approximation error as in Algorithm 3; however, we empirically analyze
the performance of the enhanced adaptive algorithm in Section 6 (see Figures 2 and 3 for privacy
spending and approximation loss).
4.5 Last Phase: Non-Interactive DP Mechanisms for Model Explanation
While Algorithm 3 spends less privacy budget than Algorithm 1, it will eventually exhaust its
privacy budget after explaining finitely many datapoints. However, by explaining a sufficiently
large number of datapoints, we gather enough information to generate explanations for new
queries, without spending any additional privacy budget.
Let H be the history of the explanation queries and their explanation generated by Algorithm 3
using a total privacy budget of (, δ). We propose a non-interactive phase algorithm for generating
model explanations, which takes H the output of Algorithm 3 as input, and generates an
explanation for new queries without spending any additional privacy budget. The main idea of
this approach is that if H contains enough information about the underlying black-box model
that, making additional queries to the explanation dataset X unnecessary. We can rather use the
explanations already given to the user (adversary) and their own dataset to explain additional
queries.
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Algorithm 4: Non-Interactive DP for Model Explanation
Input: Privately explained history H where h = |H|, List of point of interest queries
{~zh, . . . } ∈ Rn arriving one by one;
1: X ′ = {~z1, . . . ~zh}, fˆ(·) ; // According to section 4.5
2: for i = h+1,. . . do
3: φPriv (~zi) = arg minφ∈C2,1 L(φ, ~zh,X ′, fˆ(·));
4: report: φPriv (~zi); // Report explanation of ~zi
5: end
We construct a proxy explanation dataset using the history H which contains explained
datapoints and their corresponding differentially private explanation. The proxy explanation
dataset is simply X ′ = {~z1, . . . ~zh : ~zj ∈ H}, i.e. the points queried by the user. Their labels are
the corresponding model explanations, which are linear approximations of the original model:
fˆ(X ′) = {φPriv (~zj)> ·~zj : j = 1, . . . , h}. Given a new query ~z, we generate a new query via a linear
approximation of the black box model around ~z using X ′ and the corresponding differentially
private approximation fˆ(X ′).
φPriv (~z,H) = arg min
φ∈C
∑
~zj∈X ′
α(‖~zj − ~z‖)(φ> · (~zj − ~z)− fˆ(~zj))2 (8)
The non-interactive phase is described in Algorithm 4 with details. It takes H history as
an input which is consists of differentially private explanations of past queries and computes
explanations for further explanation queries. The non-interactive phase generates an explanation
for a new query ~z by optimizing (8) which provides a linear approximation of the black-box model
around the point ~z. However, we do not need to spend any privacy budget for generating a private
explanation for ~z as it does not use the explanation dataset X for any further computations
and fˆ(·) is already computed using differential privacy [14]. This allows the adaptive version to
explain infinitely many queries even after the entire privacy budget has been spent. We evaluate
the performance of the non-interactive phase in Section 6.
5 Protecting the Privacy of the Training Dataset
The analysis in Sections 3 and 4 shows that our mechanisms protect the explanation dataset . In
what follows, we analyze their training data (T ) privacy guarantees.
The only potential source of training data information leakage is the gradients computed
by our algorithm at each iteration. Our algorithms inject Gaussian noise to the gradient of the
loss function at each iteration; fortunately, this noise injection offers some privacy guarantees
with respect to the training dataset. We quantify the improvement in the privacy guarantees of
the training dataset due to the randomness inserted by our explanation algorithms when the
underlying training process is (ˆ, δˆ)-differentially private. By the post-processing property of the
differential privacy [14], explanations generated by our algorithm are already (ˆ, δˆ)-differentialy
private, however, in Theorem 5.1, we show that our explanations improve the privacy guarantees
for the training dataset. We also show that even if the training process is non-differentialy
private (training process doesn’t provide any protection for the training dataset), our explanation
algorithms provide (O(m), δ)-differential privacy.
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Theorem 5.1 (Privacy amplification for the training dataset). Suppose that the underlying
training process of the black-box model f is (ˆ, δˆ)-differentially private w.r.t. the training dataset,
then the explanation algorithm described in Algorithm 1 with parameters (, δ) is (ˆ, γδˆ)-differentilly
private for the training dataset, where, γ ∈ 1 − O
((
log T
δ
m
)(
e
− m
log(Tδ )
))
. Moreover for any
training process, Algorithm 1 is (O(m), δ)-differentially private for the training dataset.
Proof. See Appendix H
Theorem 5.1 (proven in Appendix H) shows that our privacy guarantees with respect to the
training set grow weaker as the size of the explanation dataset (the parameter m) increases; this
presents a natural tradeoff between the amount of data used by the mechanisms generating model
explanations, and the privacy guarantees we can offer with respect to the training data.
At first glance, our guarantees seem rather weak - growing linearly worse in m. However, our
bound is tight: consider the (extremely unstable) training where the label of all datapoints in the
dataspace depends on the presence of a single data record in the training dataset; if this point is
present then all labels are +1, and are −1 otherwise. Protecting against information leaks in this
example is nearly impossible, irrespective of the model explanation mechanism [29, 30].
6 Experimental Results
We evaluate our model explanations on standard machine learning datasets. We use the following
benchmark datasets (we use the datasets in their entirety as the explanation dataset X ):
ACS13: We use a scrubbed version of the dataset used in [10]1 containing 1, 494, 974 records
and predict income (> 50k$ vs ≤ 50k$). We train a random forest classifier with 500 trees with
maximum depth = 10, which achieves 85% training accuracy and 84% test accuracy.
IMDB/Amazon Movie Reviews (Text dataset) [22, 26]: This dataset consists of
8, 765, 568 movie reviews from the Amazon review dataset along with 50, 000 movie reviews from
IMDB large review dataset mapped to binary vector using the top 500 words. Each movie review
is labeled as either a positive (+1) or a negative (−1) review. We consider the true labels as the
output of some unknown black-box algorithm.
Facial expression dataset [16] This dataset consists of 12, 156 48 × 48 pixel grayscale
images of faces. We train a CNN with two convolution layers with 5 × 5 filters followed by
max-pooling and a fully connected layer, achieving training and test accuracy of 86% and 84.3%,
respectively. We use this dataset to demonstrate the visualization of our explanations.
We repeat experiments 10 times, and plot their average behavior.
6.1 Interactive DP Model Explanation
We use our non-adaptive protocol (Algorithm 1) to generate private model explanations for points
in all datasets. We compare the explanations we generate with existing non-private model agnostic
explanation methods. In the Text dataset, we generate differentially private model explanations
for 1000 randomly sampled datapoints (movie reviews) from the dataset with strong privacy
parameters  = 0.1 and δ = 10−6. We present a few examples in Table 2. The explanations
generated by our protocol agree with well-established non-private model agnostic explanations:
using LIME [27] and MIM [33], we extract the top 5 most influencial words. According to our
1Pulled from http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/.
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Table 2: Examples of influence measures generated for Text movie reviews dataset by Algorithm 1 with
 ≈ 0.1 and δ = 10−6, LIME and MIM. Upwards (downwards) arrows indicate a high positive (negative)
influence of a word. Moreover blue, red and green arrows correspond to words selected to Algorithm 1,
LIME, and MIM.
Movie Review label
1. ... year Batman ... attempted make well↑↑ acted De Vito ... bad↓↓↓ intentions
... searching past would↓↓ like ... given bad↓↓↓ reviews...
+1
2. ...superb↑↑↑ performance by Natalie Portman... saying script bad↓ at times
but I don’t↓↓...The film look↑ bad, don’t good↑ direction and excellent↑↑
performances↑↑...
+1
3. Yeah adults may find stupid↑↑↑... don’t↑↑ think really bad.... The story↓
aAlvin gang... across world search jewels bad↑↑↑ .... with... So animation
good↓ ...
-1
4. I never seen such horrible↑↑ special affects or acting... I laughed↓↓↓ so hard
on this its just stupid↑ I mean the movie is so awful↑↑↑...
-1
Table 3: Summary of mean ± Variance of loss in utility for each dataset for explanation generated by
Algorithm 1 (Theorem 3.2).
Dataset  = 0.01, δ = 10−6  = 0.1, δ = 10−6
Face 1.4× 10−2 ± 4.3× 10−3 2.2× 10−3 ± 2.1× 10−4
Text 2.7× 10−3 ± 7.8× 10−4 4.3× 10−4 ± 9.4× 10−6
ACS13 5.7× 10−3 ± 1.3× 10−3 2.6× 10−4 ± 6.3× 10−5
evaluation, our protocol and MIM share 2.6 of the top 5 influential words on average, whereas our
protocol and LIME share 3.9 words on average, with a variance of less than 0.3 in both cases.
How does explanation quality degrade as we make our privacy requirements more stringent?
This can be visually observed for the facial expression dataset by generating explanation by
Algorithm 1 with different  values, and a fixed δ = 10−5 (Figure 1); Algorithm 1 generates
explanations that appear meaningful with  ≥ 0.07 and δ = 10−5.
We compare the loss of our explanation algorithm defined in Equation (4) for different privacy
parameters  on 1000 randomly selected datapoints from the datasets. We compute the mean ±
variance value of the approximation loss for ACS13 and Text dataset for  = 0.01 and  = 0.1
with δ = 10−6 (Table 3). The loss decreases as we relax privacy requirements (this follows from
Theorem 3.2). We compute better explanations for the Text dataset than the ACS13 dataset;
this can be explained by their different dimensionality (the
√
n/m factor in Theorem 3.2).
6.2 Saving the Privacy Budget via the Adaptive Approach
We analyze both privacy spending and loss in our adaptive protocols, as compared to the baseline
non-adaptive protocol (Algorithm 1). We randomly sample three batches of 1500 datapoints and
divide the explanation dataset into three equal-sized, disjoint parts.
We run parallel composition [23] for our private explanations by separately using the three
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POI = 0.015 = 0.075 = 0.15 = 0.45 = 0.75
Figure 1: The effect of varying  on explanation quality of Algorithm 1. The color blue (red) indicates
positive (negative) influence. Brighter colors indicate greater influence.
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Figure 2: Explanation quality and privacy guarentees for the ACS13 dataset.
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Non-Adaptive
Adaptive
Enhanced-Adaptive
Number of Queries
P
ri
va
cy
B
ud
ge
t
Sp
en
t

(a) Total privacy budget spent by the non-
adaptive (Algorithm 1), adaptive (Algo-
rithm 3) and enhanced adaptive algorithms
on the same sample for the Text dataset.
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Figure 3: Sub-figure 3a shows the total privacy budget spent by the non-adaptive (Algorithm 1),
adaptive (Algorithm 3) and enhanced adaptive algorithms on the same sample for the Text
dataset. The x-axis represents the number of queries answered, and the y-axis shows the value of
privacy parameter . Sub-figure 3b is the normalized loss histogram for queries explained by the
adaptive, enhanced adaptive and Non-interactive phase. The adaptive approach has a lower loss
than the non-interactive phase, a natural trade-off between privacy and utility.
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disjoint explanation datasets to explain three sequences of 1500 queries. We predefine a desired
level of loss guarantee; in other words, both model explanations must achieve the same explanation
quality, to ensure a valid comparison. We set the per-query  parameter to  = 0.01 for the
ACS13 dataset, and to  = 0.006 for the Text dataset. In both evaluations we set δ = 10−7,
and set the maximal number of DPGD-Explain() iterations to T = 300. This upper bound is
only reached for 94/4500 (73/4500) queries for the Text(ACS13) dataset. In all other cases, the
adaptive algorithms were able to find a better initialization point. See Figure 5 for more details.
Interestingly, for the Text (ACS13) data, on average, over 1850 (2220) instances had a better
initialization point, which failed to satisfy the
√
nσmin ≤ β condition, and thus had to proceed
with T ′ = 91 (T ′ = 95) (the minimum iterations theoretically required according to Theorem 4.4.
We note that this minimum T ′ improves as we relax our privacy requirements (Theorem 4.4),
allowing the adaptive algorithm to save more of the privacy budget. The improved performance
for the ACS13 dataset may be explained by the fact that it consists of dense regions, as compared
to the Text dataset.
We analyze privacy spending and loss values (Equation 1) by different algorithms in Figure 2
(ACS13) and Figure 3 (Text). The adaptive protocols spend most of their privacy budget on the
initial ∼ 100 queries; after they generate enough information, they capitalize on it to explain the
remaining queries using a smaller per-query privacy budget. Furthermore, the adaptive protocols
achieve the same explanation quality as the non-adaptive protocol, while utilizing a much smaller
privacy budget (as predicted by Theorem 4.5). Figures 2b and 3b show that the Adaptive and
Enhanced-Adaptive protocols exhibit a similar distribution of loss values, with a significant
difference in the privacy spending rate. This can be explained by the dominance of Gaussian
noise over the “good” initialization point.
In Figure 4, we plot the convergence of DPGD-Explain for 15 randomly selected data points
for which Algorithm 3 found an initialization point with β <
√
nσmin(line 8 of Algorithm 2). We
observe that after the first few iterations, Gaussian noise dominates and increases the loss value;
only later does it converge to a loss close to the initial point in such cases. This results in extra
spending of privacy without any gain in approximation loss. This empirically explains the similar
distribution of explanation quality by adaptive and enhanced adaptive algorithms (Figures 2b
and 3b) despite that enhanced adaptive algorithm iterates less number of iterations compare to
adaptive algorithm and spends significant lesser privacy budget (Figures 2b and 3b).
Once Algorithm 3 explains 4500 queries, we use its output to generate additional explanations
in the Non-Interactive Phase (without spending any further privacy budget) for another randomly
sampled 4500 datapoints for both datasets. The non-interactive phase exhibits higher loss, but
spends none of the privacy budget (Figure 3).
6.3 Differentially Private Explanation for Differentially Private Models
We train differentially private neural networks (all with the same architecture) on the IMDB
Dataset [22] using the Tensorflow differential privacy library [4]; we obtain differentially private
models of the form fˆ with different privacy parameters ˆ = 0.5, 2, 10 and δˆ = 10−5. The models
are trained on the same training and test dataset, split in a 70 : 30 ratio (35, 000 training reviews
and 15, 000 test reviews). The models f0.5, f2, f10 achieve a test accuracy of 52%, 74%, 81%
respectively. We also train a non-private model, f , which achieves a test accuracy of 83.6%.
We also train differentially private neural networks (all with the same architecture) on the
Face Dataset, with privacy parameters ˆ = 0.5, 2, 10 and δˆ = 10−5. They achieve a test accuracy
of 51%, 62% and 80% respectively. We also train a non-private model, f , which achieves test
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Figure 4: The convergence pattern of DP gradient descent for 15 randomly selected from explained queries
for ACS13 dataset by Algorithm 3 , where σmin > β√n for the initial point, line 8 of Algorithm 2. This
is where the initial point is close to the optimal point. The noise variance pushes the good initialization
away from the optimal point, only to re-converge to nearly the same level.
accuracy of 84.3%. The models are trained on the same training and test dataset split into 70 : 30
ratio (number of training images = 8510 and test images = 3646).
We generate private explanations (Algorithm 1 with  = 0.1, δ = 10−5 and T = 200) for all
models for the same randomly sampled 500 datapoints. We compare the private explanation
for the POI for the different private models with the base optimal explanation for the non-
private model. We compute the distortion (Dist) for each POI and DP models: Dist(~x, fˆ) =
‖φPriv (~x, fˆ)− φ∗(~x, f)‖. Dist captures the change in the models’ behavior around POI due to
noise added in the training process. We plot the histogram of the Dist values in Figure 7(a)
observe that the Dist values are much larger for the model f0.5, compared to f10. This is intuitive:
for smaller ˆ, model becomes noisier and uses random features for the classification. We further
analyze this visually.
In Figure 6, we visually represent the explanation generated for different private models for
an image which was misclassified as a happy face by all models. When the privacy requirements
are extremely high (ˆ = 0.5), feature influence is randomly distributed: this informally shows
that the modal randomly classified the image as a happy face; however, as we relax the privacy
requirements of the training dataset, the model explanation becomes more constructive, utilizing
important features. For example, pixels around lips start having high positive influence.
We plot the histogram of the approximation error (Equation 4) in Figure 7(b) and observe
that the approximation error is higher for the model f0.5. As f0.5 becomes noisy, it assigns labels
randomly around POI. This unpredictable behavior of the model around POI requires more
iterations to converge to the optimal linear approximation. Indeed, differentially private models
with strong privacy guarantees are difficult to approximate by the DPGD-Explain() procedure
spending more of the privacy budget for the same level of approximation loss.
To evaluate the impact of noisy/random model behavior around the POI, and the explanation
approximation error, we plot the approximation error vs misclassification error of the model
around a POI in Figure 8. For all differentially private models, there is a positive correlation
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Figure 5: The normalized histogram of the number of DP gradient descent iterations by the Adaptive
Algorithm (Algorithm 3) and the Enhanced-Adaptive algorithm for the ACS13 and Text datasets.This
spike for the Adaptive algorithm is due to minimum required iterations. For both the ACS13 and Text
dataset, the Enhanced-Adaptive approach iterates less than 90 times per query in most instances. The
notable spike at around 100 iterations is due to several samples running the theoretically required number
of iterations for Algorithm 3 to provably maintain its quality guarantees. See Theorem 4.4 and Line 8 of
Algorithm 2 for the related theoretical analysis. Overall, Algorithm 3 ran 149 iterations on average for the
Text dataset, and 121 for the ACS13 dataset. The Enhanced-Adaptive algorithm runs for 28 iterations
and 43 iterations on average, respectively.
POI = 0.5 = 2 = 10 Non-DP Model
Figure 6: The effect of differential private models on the explanation. The color blue (red) indicates
positive (negative) influence. Brighter colors indicate greater influence.
between explanation approximation and model misclassification error. For all models and POIs,
we use the same input paramaters to generate private explanations ( = 0.1, δ = 10−5, T = 500).
This empirically confirms that when the model “misbehaves”, randomly assigning labels around
the POI, private explanations exhibit a higher approximation error. This further shows that
differentially private models with strong privacy guarantees require more privacy budget for the
explanation dataset to achieve a similar level of explanation quality. This also explains the higher
approximation loss for f0.5 compared to f2, f10 observed in Figure 7(b).
6.4 The Effect of Data Density
The effectiveness of Algorithm 3 relies, in part, on the existence of points with low gradient loss
(denoted by β); such points are often close to the query point. To evaluate this effect, we compare
the performance of Algorithm 3 in densely and sparsely sampled queries.
We first cluster the dataset using a hierarchical clustering algorithm. We observe that while
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Figure 7: Histograms of Dist values and explanation quality for different DP models. The
approximation error and explanation quality for the model f0.5 is higher compared to f2, f10,
likely due to the complicated decision boundaries around POI for noisier models.
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Figure 8: The approximation vs misclassification error around the POI (50 nearest points to the POI) for
all DP models. The explanation quality deprecates as the model becomes more inconsistent around the
POI with a positive correlation for all models (note the different y axis max for Figures 8b and 8c). Privacy
requirements result in noisier models, which results in additional privacy spending for our explanations
algorithms.
the Text dataset is well-distributed and sparse in the dataspace, the ACS13 dataset has over
15 different clusters with different population densities. We sample in three different regimes:
first, we randomly sample three samples of size 800 from the dataset (this serves as our baseline);
second, we randomly sample three samples of 800 datapoints from the densest cluster; finally, we
sample datapoints from different clusters to intentionally sparsify the sample. We then query each
set of sampled points with Algorithm 3 in parallel composition with min = 10−2 and T = 300.
Indeed, as shown in Figure 9a, sparse samples lead to greater expenditure of the privacy budget
than dense samples. A likely explanation for this phenomenon is that densely sampled queries
exhibit consistent behavior from the black-box classifier, allowing more efficient exploitation of
past information by Algorithm 3. That said, it may be the case that two disparate regions in the
dataspace exhibit similar classifier behavior; in this scenario, Algorithm 3 can exploit previously
computed explanations from different regions.
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6.5 The Effects of Overfitting
Intuitively, overfitted models yield more complex decision boundaries, to achieve better training
accuracy. According to our hypotheses, Algorithm 3 needs to spend more privacy budget to
explain the overfitted models compare to the non-overfitted model. We train an overfitted random
decision forest with 500 trees with maximum depth = 60 on ACS13 dataset which achieves 98%
training accuracy and 80% test accuracy. We first identify the overfitted data regions: we find
clusters of training data that exhibit a significant difference in training accuracy between the
overfitted and non-overfitted models.
We randomly sample three samples of 500 data points from the overfitted region, and run
Algorithm 3 on these samples in parallel with T = 300 and min = 10−2 for both over-fitted and
non-over-fitted models. Figure 9b indicates that Algorithm 3 requires a higher privacy budget to
explain the overfitted model as compared to the non-overfitted model.
Moreover, Algorithm 3 needs to compute an average of 87 queries from the sample with full
computation whereas, for a non-overfitted model, 58 queries required full computation on average.
After an initial ≈ 150 queries on average, Algorithm 2 fails to satisfy the √nσmin ≤ β (line 8 of
Algorithm 2) condition for both overfitted and non-overfitted models and proceeds with T ′ = 95
for most instances in all cases.
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(b) Overfitting Vs. Privacy
Figure 9: Figure 9a shows the privacy budget spent by Algorithm 3 on sparse/dense/random samples from
the ACS13 dataset. Figure 9b demonstrates the privacy budget spent by Algorithm 3 on an overfitted/non-
overfitted model on the ACS13 dataset. The x-axis shows the number of queries answered; the y-axis is
the privacy budget spent - .
7 Broader Impact
Transparency in AI has become an important research topic; however, as recent works show,
model transparency poses potential risks to user privacy. Our approach provably protects against
adversaries trying to recover data used in generating explanations. Several data companies are
now offering model explanations as part of their ML suites2: if unsafe model explanations are
offered in high stakes domains (say, in explaining users’ financial or medical data as we do in our
work), they offer a novel avenue for attack that has been relatively unexplored. Our methodology
2e.g. IBM http://aix360.mybluemix.net/, Microsoft https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/machine-learning/
how-to-machine-learning-interpretability and Google’s https://cloud.google.com/explainable-ai frameworks.
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is easy to implement, and offers provable privacy and quality guarantees; thus, if our protocols
are implemented in such services, users are guaranteed to receive good explanations that protect
their personal data; the authors see this as a positive impact on society.
Our methodology does carry some risks. Our results uniformly support the existence of a
tradeoff between user privacy and explanation quality. This tradeoff can seen both through our
theoretical results and empirical analysis, and applies to both the privacy of the explanation
dataset and the model training data. This tradeoff seems to be particularly sharp in regions
where the model overfits, and for high-dimensional data. The actual effects of this tradeoff are
highly implementation and data dependent, and require further analysis as to the exact risks
they hold. It could very well be that there exist alternative modes of model explanation that
offer more favorable privacy/quality tradeoffs (or indeed, no tradeoffs whatsoever); the authors
believe that this is not the case. We believe that there is a general theory of model explanations
and user privacy: useful model explanations leak some information, and that leakage needs to
be managed from a privacy perspective. Applying our techniques does require some care: one
immediate concern is disparate impact . Regions where the model overfits to the data tend to
suffer more from privacy/quality tradeoffs; in other words, when implementing our system on
real high-stakes systems, it is important to ensure that minority groups are not adversely affected
in unacceptable ways. It is undesirable to offer low-quality model explanations to minorities, but
it is also undesirable to risk leaking their private information. This tradeoff has been alluded to
in [29], and is formally proven in our work. While it is entirely possible that this tradeoff only
exists due to the shortcomings of this work, we strongly suspect that it is a universal truth: model
explanations inevitably leak private information, and must undergo some degradation — noise
induced or otherwise — before being released. This risk must certainly be assessed carefully in
any future implementation of our work.
8 Conclusions
In this work, we provide a formal framework for studying differential privacy in model explanations.
Not only are our model explanation methods differentially private, they are also approximately
optimal. Our methods are safe and sound : offering both quality and privacy guarantees. There
are still many interesting open problems regarding the design of model explanations that simul-
taneously protect both the training and explanation datasets from exposure, while retaining
explanation accuracy.
While our work focuses on the interplay between privacy and transparency, it follows some
recent insights on the effects of privacy mechanisms on model accuracy. As we demonstrate in
Sections 6.4 and 6.5, sparse data regions and overfitted models lead to poorer performance, either
in terms of explanation accuracy, or in terms of required privacy budget. Such data regions often
correspond to underrepresented population groups; our results echo those in recent works [7, 29]:
indeed, differential privacy injects more noise to model explanations offered to minority groups.
Assessing the privacy/explainability tradeoffs for minority groups is a promising avenue for future
exploration.
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A Proof of Lemma 3.1
Lemma 3.1 (Conditions for Bounded Sensitivity for ∇L(·)). For all explanation dataset X of
size m, and all its neighboring datasets X ′, points of interest ~z, and φ ∈ C, the sensitivity of the
gradient of loss is bounded, ‖∇L(φ,X )−∇L(φ,X ′)‖2 ≤ ( cm
)
, iff α(‖~x− ~z‖) ≤ c2‖~x−~z‖2(‖~x−~z‖2+1)
for every ~x, ~z ∈ Rn.
Proof. We first note that
∇L(φ,X ) = 2
m
∑
~x∈X
α(‖~x− ~x′‖)(φ>(~x− ~x′)− f(~x))(~x− ~x′)
Now, for α(‖~x− ~x′‖) ≤ c
2‖~x−~x′‖2(‖~x−~x′‖2+1) and any ~x
′ ∈ X , ‖∇L(φ,X )−∇L(φ,X \ {~x′})‖2
≤ 2
m
α(‖~x′ − ~x‖)((φ>(~x− ~x′)− f(~x))
≤ 2
m
α(‖~x′ − ~x‖)(‖φ‖2‖~x− ~x′‖2 − f(~x)) ≤ c
m
all inequalities are tight,which concludes the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 3.2
Theorem 3.2 (Bounded Utility Loss). Algorithm 1 is (, δ) differentially private. Moreover,
for given privacy parameters (, δ), if DPGD-Explain() runs for T ≤ min
(
m22
32n log2(e+1/δ)
, 1δ
)
iterations and outputs an explanation φPriv , then E(φPriv ) ∈ O
(
log T√
T
)
. For T = m
22
32n log2(e+1/δ)
,
E(φPriv ) ∈ O
(√
n logm
m
)
.
Proof. Theorem 2 in [28] shows that for a gradient descent algorithm φt+1 ← ΓC
(
φt − η(t)gˆ(t)
)
with E[gˆ(t))] = L(φ,X ), η(t) = c√
t
and E(‖gˆ(t)‖2) ≤ G2,
E
[L(φPriv ,X , c)]−min
φ∈C
L(φ,X , c) ≤
(1
c
+ cG2
)2 + log T√
T
The obove bound minimize for c = 1G . By putting C =
1
G , we get
E
[L(φPriv ,X , c)]−min
φ∈C
L(φ,X , c) ≤ 2G× 2 + log T√
T
In Algorithm 1, gˆ(t) = ∇L(φ,X ) + ~Z, where Zi ∼ N (0, σ2I). As E(~Z) = ~0, we can write
E(‖gˆ(t)‖2) as
E(‖gˆ(t)‖2) = ‖∇L(φ,X )‖2 + E
[ n∑
i=1
Z2i
]
≤ 1 + 16Tn log(e +
√
T/δ) log Tδ
m22
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For T ≤ m22
32n log2(e+/δ)
, G ≤ √2 which implies that E(φPriv ) ∈ log
(
log T√
T
)
Also for T > m
22
32n log2(e+/δ)
; function 2G× 2+log T√
T
increases as T increases. Therefore by setting
T = m
22
32n log2(e+/δ)
for the optimal upper bound, we get
E(φPriv ) ∈ O
(√
n log
(
1
δ
)
log(m/
√
n)
m
)
For large m, ignoring the log 1δ term,
E(φPriv ) ∈ O
(√
n log(m/
√
n)
m
)
C Proof of Lemma 4.1
Lemma 4.1 (Stability of the α(·) Function). If ‖~v − ~z‖ ≤ d then for all ~x ∈ X :
α(‖~x− ~v‖)
α(‖~x− ~z‖) ≤ 1 + max
(
(d2 + 2rd)
r2
, 2(d2 + 2rd+ d)
)
.
Furthermore, if d ∈ o(r) then α(‖~x−~v‖)α(‖~x−~z‖) < 1 +O(d).
Proof. We first note that when ‖~x− ~z‖ ≤ r α(‖~x−~v‖)α(‖~x−~z‖) = α(‖~x−~v‖)1 ≤ 1 since α(·) ≤ 1 on any input.
Thus, we analyse the case when ‖~v − ~z‖ > r. If ‖~x− ~v‖ ≤ r then:
α(‖~x− ~v‖)
α(‖~x− ~z‖) =
1
c
2‖~x−~z‖(1+‖~x−~z‖)
=
2‖~x− z‖(1 + ‖~x− ~z‖)
c
≤ 2(r + d)(1 + r + d)
c
=
2(r2 + r) + 2(d2 + 2rd)
c
= 1 +
2(d2 + 2rd)
c
Now, for ‖~x − ~v‖ > r: if ‖~x − ~v‖ ≥ ‖~x − ~z‖ then by definition of the weight function,
α(‖~x−~v‖)
α(‖~x−~z‖) ≤ 1. Therefore we analyse the case when ‖~x− ~v‖ < ‖~x− ~z‖;
α(‖~x− ~v‖)
α(‖~x− ~z‖) =
(‖~x− z‖)(1 + ‖~x− ~z‖)
(‖~x− ~v‖)(1 + ‖~x− ~v‖)
As we know, ‖~x− ~z‖ ≤ d; ‖~x− ~z‖ ≤ d+ ‖~x− ~v‖. By using this inequality;
α(‖~x− ~v‖)
α(‖~x− ~v‖) ≤
(d+ ‖~x− ~v‖)(1 + ‖~x− ~v‖+ d)
(‖~x− ~v‖)(1 + ‖~x− ~v‖)
≤
(
1 +
d
r
)(
1 +
d
r + 1
)
≤ 1 + d
2 + 2rd
r2
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Which shows that for all ~x ∈ X
α(‖~x− ~v‖)
α(‖~x− ~z‖) ≤ 1 + max
(
(d2 + 2rd)
r2
,
2(d2 + 2rd+ d)
c
)
Finally, suppose that d ∈ o(r); in this case, (d2+2rd)
r2
< d× 3r ∈ O(d), and
2(d2 + 2rd+ d)
c
<
d(3r + 1)
c
∈ O(d),
which shows that, for d ∈ o(r)
α(‖~x− ~v‖)
α(‖~x− ~z‖) ≤ 1 +O(d) , ∀~x ∈ X (9)
D Proof of Theorem 4.2
Next, let us prove Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.2. (Consistent Explanations in Small Regions) For α(·) described in (5), if we have
φ∗(~z) ∈ arg minφ∈C L(φ, ~z,X ), and φ∗(~v) = arg minφ∈C L(φ,~v,X ) and ‖~x− ~z‖ ≤ d r, then
L(φ∗(~z), ~v,X )− L(φ∗(~v), ~v,X ) < 8d+O(d2).
Moreover, |L(φ,~v,X )− L(φ, ~z,X )| ∈ O(d2) for all φ ∈ C
Proof. First, L(φ∗(~z), ~v,X ) equals:
1
m
∑
~x∈X
α(‖~x− ~v‖)(φ∗(~z)>(~x− ~v)− f(~x))2 =
1
m
∑
~x∈X
α(‖~x− ~v‖)(φ∗(~z)>(~x− ~z)− f(~x) + φ∗(~z)>(~z − ~v))2
≤ 1
m
∑
~x∈X
α(‖~x− ~v‖)(φ∗(~z)>(~v − ~z)− f(~x))2 + d2
+
d
m
∑
y∈X
α(‖~x− ~v‖)|φ∗(~z)>(~x− ~z)− f(~x)|
Now, for ‖~v − ~z‖ ≤ d < r;
α(‖~x− ~v‖)|φ∗(~z)>(~x− ~z)− f(~x)| ≤ (1 + d+ r)
and α(‖~x − ~v‖) ≤ 1. By Lemma 4.1, α(‖~x − ~v‖) ≤ (1 + O(d))α(‖~x − ~z‖), which implies that
L(φ∗(~z), ~v,X ) is upper bounded by
1 +O(d)
m
∑
~x∈X
α(‖~x− ~z‖)(φ∗(~z)>(~x− ~z)− f(~x))2 + (2 + r)d+O(d2) ≤
1 +O(d)
m
∑
~x∈X
α(‖~x− ~z‖)(φ∗(~v)>(~x− ~v)− f(~x)φ∗(~v)>(~v − ~z))2 + (2 + r)d+O(d2)
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Invoking Lemma 4.1 again we have α(‖~x−~z‖) ≤ (1+O(d))α(‖~x−~v‖), and the last inequality follows
from the fact that L(φ∗(~z), ~z,X ) ≤ L(φ∗(~v), ~z,X ). By combining these results, L(φ∗(~z), ~v,X ) is
upper bounded by
≤ (1 +O(d))2L(φ∗(~v), ~v,X )) + 2(2 + r)d+O(d2)
Now, L(φ∗(~v), ~v,X )) ≤ L(~0, ~v,X )) ≤ 1, Which shows that,
L(φ∗(~z), ~v,X )− L(φ∗(~v), ~v,X ) ≤ (6 + 2r)d+O(d2) (10)
and concludes the proof of the first part. For the second part, take any φ ∈ C, then |L(φ,~v,X )−
L(φ, ~z,X )|
≤ O(d
2)
m
∑
~x∈X
α(‖~x− ~v‖)(‖~x− ~v‖+ ‖~x− ~z‖+ 2)
Now, if ‖~x− ~v‖ ≤ r then α(‖~x− ~v‖)(‖~x− ~v‖+ ‖~x− ~z‖+ 2) ≤ (2(r + 2) + d) and if ‖~x− ~v‖ > r
then α(‖~x− ~v‖)(‖~x− ~v‖+ ‖~x− ~z‖+ 2) ≤ (1 + r+d+1r ), which shows that, for all φ ∈ C;
|L(φ,~v,X )− L(φ, ~z,X )| ∈ O(d2)
E Proof of Lemma 4.3
Lemma 4.3 (Initialization Dependent Upper-Bound). If ‖∇L(φ{0}, ~v,X )‖ = β, then for some c,
and η(t) = c√
t
;
E(φ{T}, ~x) ∈ O
((
(σ2n+ β2)
1
2 + (nσ2 log T )
1
4
) log T√
T
)
(7)
Proof. The proof of the lemma uses [28, Theorem 2]. We denote gt = η(t)
[∇L(φ{t}, ~v,X ) +
N (0, σ2I)] and L(φ{t}, ~v,X ) by L(φ{t}). By extending the inequality in [28, Equation (2)] we
obtain;
E[g>t (φ{t} − φ{T−k})] ≤
1
2c
[
√
T −√T − k] + 1
2
T∑
t=T−k
cE[‖gt‖2]√
t
Now, we know that ‖∇L(φ{0})‖2 = β2. By using Taylor’s Theorem we get,
∇L(φ{t+1}) = ∇L(φ{t}) +∇2L(φ{t})(φ{t+1} − φ{t})
= (I− η(t)∇2L(φ{t}))∇L(φ{t})− η(t)∇2L(φ{t})Zt
Where Zt ∼ N (0, σ2I). As ∇2L(φ{t}) is a semi-positive-definite matrix with ‖∇2L(φ{t})‖ ≤ 1,
E[‖∇L(φ{t+1})‖2] ≤ E[‖∇L(φ{t})‖2] + η2(t)nσ2 ≤
E[‖∇L(φ0)‖2] + nσ2
t∑
l=1
c2
l
≤ β2 + nσ2c2 log t
≤ β2 + nσ2c2 log T
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Therefore E[‖gt‖2] ≤ (β2 + nσ2) + nσ2c2 log T . As L(·) is a convex function, by [28, Theorem
2], we obtain,
E(φ{T}, ~x) ≤
(
1
c
+ c(nσ2 + β2) + c3nσ2 log T
)
(log T + 2)√
T
The above bound is minimized for the positive solution of: − 1
c2
+ (nσ2 + β2) + 3nσ2c2 = 0.
Which implies that the above bound minimizes for,
c2 =
2(
(nσ2 + β2) +
√
(nσ2 + β2)2 + 12nσ2 log T
) (11)
Plugging back the optimal c, we get
E(φ{T}, ~x) ∈ O
((
(σ2n+ β2)
1
2 + (nσ2 log T )
1
4
) log T√
T
)
Which concludes the proof.
F Proof of Theorem 4.4
Let us now prove Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.4 (Number of Iterations). Let φ{0} = φPriv (~z) be the initialization point given to the
DPGD-Explain() procedure, with ‖∇L(φ{0}, ~v,X )‖ = β. Given the update rule in Equation (6),
if max(
√
nσ, β) ≤ 1(log T )a for a > 12 , then for T ′ = max(
√
nσ, β)1−
1
2aT : E(φ{T}, ~v) ∈ O
(
log T√
T
)
.
Proof. Let b = max(
√
nσ, β), substituting T ′ = bT into Lemma 4.3, we get,
E(φ{T}, ~v) ∈ O
(
b
1
2 log
5
4 (bT )
b
1
2
− 1
4aT
1
2
)
For b ≤ 1(log T )a , b
1
4a log
5
4 (bT ) ≤ log T , which implies that E(φ{T}, ~v) ∈ O
(
log T
T
1
2
)
, concluding the
proof.
G Proof of Theorem 4.5
Theorem 4.5. (Utility Loss) Let φPriv (z1), . . . φPriv (zh) be the output of the Algorithm 3, then for
all j = 1, . . . , h; E(φPriv (zj), ~zj) ∈ O
(
log T√
T
)
. Moreover, for lower dimensional setting (m > nite )
and T =
√
m: E(φPriv (zj), ~zj) ∈ O
(
logm/m
1
4
)
Proof. Theorem 4.5 is a corollary of Theorem 4.2, Theorem 4.4 and Theorem 3.2. First, if the If
condition in line 2 of Algorithm 3 is satisfied, then as l < k, by Theorem 4.2,
|L(φPriv (~zj), ~zj)− L(φ∗(~zj), ~zj)| ≤ |L(φPriv (~zj), ~zj)
− L(φPriv (~zj), ~x)|+ |L(φPriv (~zj), ~x)− L(φ∗(~zj), ~zj)|
∈ O(log2 T/T ) +O(log T/
√
T ) ∈ O
(
log T√
T
)
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For other cases; by Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 4.4;
E(φPriv (~zj), ~zj) ∈ O
(
log T√
T
)
By substituting T =
√
m, we get that E(φPriv (zj), ~zj) ∈ O
(
logm/m
1
4
)
, which concludes the
proof.
H Proof of Theorem 5.1
Before we prove Theorem 5.1, we prove the following technical lemma.
Lemma H.1. If X,Y and Z are random variables defined on the same probability space with
same compact range R and X ⊥ Z, Y ⊥ Z and X ⊥ Y then the total variation distance,
TV(X + Z, Y + Z) ≤ max
x,y
TV(X + Z|X = x, Y + Z|Y = y)
Proof. The definition of the Total variation distance between two distribution is defined as
TV(X + Z, Y + Z) = sup
E
(Pr[X + Z ∈ E]− Pr[Y + Z ∈ E])
= sup
E
(∫
R
Pr[x+ Z ∈ E]fX(x)dx−
∫
R
Pr[y + Z ∈ E]fY (y)dy
)
≤ sup
E
(
max
x
Pr[x+ Z ∈ E]
∫
R
fX(x)dx−min
y
Pr[y + Z ∈ E]
∫
R
fY (y)dy
)
= sup
E
(
max
x
Pr[x+ Z ∈ E]−min
y
Pr[y + Z ∈ E]
)
(12)
Where fX and fY denotes the density function of the probability distribution of X and Y . Now
if X = x∗ and Y = y∗ maximize the difference maxx,y(Pr[Z + x ∈ E]− Pr[Z + y ∈ E]) for any
E, that implies that x∗ = arg max Pr[Z + x ∈ E] and y∗ = arg min Pr[Z + y ∈ E]. The equality
in Equation 12 follows from the fact that fX and fY are probability densities. This shows that
TV(X + Z, Y + Z) ≤ sup
E
(
max
x,y
(Pr[x+ Z ∈ E]− Pr[y + Z ∈ E])
)
= max
x,y
(
sup
E
(Pr[x+ Z ∈ E]− Pr[y + Z ∈ E])
)
= max
x,y
TV(X + Z|X = x, Y + Z|Y = y)
This concludes the proof.
Theorem 5.1 (Privacy amplification for the training dataset). Suppose that the underlying
training process of the black-box model f is (ˆ, δˆ)-differentially private w.r.t. the training dataset,
then the explanation algorithm described in Algorithm 1 with parameters (, δ) is (ˆ, γδˆ)-differentilly
private for the training dataset, where, γ ∈ 1 − O
((
log T
δ
m
)(
e
− m
log(Tδ )
))
. Moreover for any
training process, Algorithm 1 is (O(m), δ)-differentially private for the training dataset.
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Proof. We first bound the sensitivity of gradients with respect to the training dataset; i.e. if a
particular datapoint is removed from the training dataset of the black-box model f , then the
change in the gradient of the loss function is bounded given φ and explanation dataset X . Suppose
that f and f ′ are black-box models trained on the training set T and T \ ~v respectively; then for
any φ1, φ2 ∈ C2,1, explanation dataset X and weight function α(·) ∈ F(c, ~z):
‖∇L(φ1,X , f)−∇L(φ2,X , f ′)‖
=
2
m
∥∥∥∑
~y∈X
α(‖~y − ~z‖)((φ1 − φ2)>(~y − ~x) + f(~y)− f ′(~y))(~y − ~z)
∥∥∥
≤ c
m
∑
~y∈X
(|f(~y)− f ′(~y)|) + (‖φ1‖+ ‖φ2‖)‖~y − ~z‖
(1 + ‖~y − ~z‖) ≤ 2c (13)
The first inequality is derived from the fact that α(·) ∈ F(c, ~z). LetM(T ) and be the training
process on the dataset T which outputs a probability distribution on the parameter space of
the black-box model Θ where each θ corresponds to the learned black-box function. For a fixed
parameter θ ∈ Θ (black-box function f), our explanation algorithm computes T many noisy
iterative gradients L(~x, φ{i}, f)+Z for i = 0, . . . , T −1 and output φ{T}, a probability distribution
over explanations (set C). To show that this transformation3 improves the privacy guarantees of
the training dataset due to randomness added during the optimization, we use similar techniques
described in [8], and utilize contraction transformations.
Now, for any two different parameterizations θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ, we denote the corresponding black-box
functions f1, f2. For simplicity, we denote the distribution of φ{T−1} − η(T − 1)∇L(φ{T−1}, f) as
µ. The total variation between the distribution φ{T}|θ1, φ{T}|θ2 can be written as:
TV(φ{T}|θ1, φ{T}|θ2) = TV (µ+ η(T − 1)ZT−1)|θ1, µ+ η(T − 1)ZT−1|θ2)) ;Z ∼ N (o, σ2I)
≤ max
φ1,φ2∈C
TV
(
µ+ ZT−1)|θ1 ∧ φ{T−1} = φ1, µ+ ZT−1|θ2 ∧ φ{T−1} = φ2)
)
(14)
Equation 14 follows from the Lemma H.1. Once we condition on φ{T−1}, both distributions in
the above equation follows a Normal distribution with different means; we write φ1 = µ | φ{T−1}
and φ2 = µ | φ{T−1} respectively. Both have the same variance: η(T − 1)2σ2I. Note that φ1 and
φ2 are not random quantities. For Gaussian random variables with same variance matrix and
different means, [9, Theorem-1], provides the exact value of the total variation distance between
3More formally we can define the transformation as a Markov kernel. For more details, see [8]
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them. Using this result we obtain:
TV(φ{T}|θ1, φ{T}|θ2) (15)
≤ max
φ1,φ2∈C
2 Pr
[
Z ∈
(
0,
‖φ1 − φ2 + η(T − 1)(∇L(φ2, f1)−∇L(φ2, f2)‖
2η(T − 1)σ
)]
≤ max
φ1,φ2∈C
2 Pr
[
Z ∈
(
0,
‖φ1‖+ ‖φ2‖+ η(T − 1)‖∇L(φ2, f1)−∇L(φ2, f2)‖
2η(T − 1)σ
)]
≤ max
φ1,φ2∈C
2 Pr
[
Z ∈
(
0,
1 + η(T − 1)c
η(T − 1)σ
)]
= 2 Pr
[
Z ∈
(
0,
1 + η(T − 1)c
η(T − 1)σ
)]
≤ 2 Pr
[
Z ∈
(
0,
m
16
√
2 log
(
2T
δ
))] (16)
Where Z ∼ N (0, 1). The first inequality in Equation 16 follows from Equation 13. Equation 16
and [8, Theorem 1] concludes the proof of the first part of the theorem.
The second part follows from Equation 13. The sensitivity of the gradient wrt. training dataset is
2m times the sensitivity of the explanation dataset. Concluding the proof.
33
